zones of settlement according to the degree of concentration of the Turkish population, this law was designed to 'create a country speaking with one language, thinking in the same way and sharing the same sentiment…'
3 . Among the regulations and laws that were issued during the interwar period, this law is the most striking one in manifesting the assimilative mentality of the government.
Citation: Ülker, Erol 'Assimilation of the Muslim communities in the first decade of the Turkish Republic (1923 Republic ( -1934 [4] This periodization is not coincidental. I aim to demonstrate that the law of 1934 did not formulate the assimilative design of settlement policies for the first time. Rather, its function was to combine the forerunning practices of settlement-immigration designed earlier by the various pieces of official regulations under the same legislation. These earlier legislations were built on the attempt of constructing a culturally and linguistically homogenous nation, a device of nation building which came onto the agenda of governmental policies long before the settlement law of 1934.
[5] This is to say that the use of settlement-immigration policies for assimilatory purposes was not unique to the 1930s. Fuat Dündar provided an extensive documentation of how the Turkification policies conducted by the Young Turk rule after the Balkan Wars targeted not only Greek and
Armenian communities of the late Ottoman Empire but also non-Turkish speaking Muslims such as Bosniaks, Albanians, Kurds and Arabs (Dündar 1999) . Making an extensive use of Dündar's work, I
have also discussed elsewhere that the different ethnic and linguistic groups were subject to different settlement policies after the Balkan Wars (Ülker 2005) .
[6] This is by no means to say that nothing changed from the Young Turks period to the Republic in terms of the settlement-immigration policies. Nor is it to claim that the dynamics of assimilation or, more broadly, Turkification policies were the same under the Young Turk regime and the Republic. Discussing the changing dynamics of Turkification and the relevance of the settlementimmigration policies to these dynamics in the imperial and the republican contexts is a subject of an independent article. Such an attempt must not only deal with the changing dynamics of Turkification but also question if this very term is a sufficient concept to define altogether a number of separate, if not independent, policies such as geographical nationalization, assimilation and dissimilation.
[7] Suffice it to underline in this article that the ruling elite of the young Republic was quite familiar with how to put the settlement-immigration policies into the service of homogenizing the population. The Young Turk rule considered the settlement of Muslim immigrants as an important tool of social engineering. They were settled throughout Anatolia in order to increase the number of Muslims in regions where non-Muslim groups constituted the majority. While deporting the nonMuslims, the government tried to settle the Muslim immigrants in their stead (Dündar 1999: 65) .
[8] At the same time, the CUP government did not consider the Muslim immigrants as a homogenous group of people. Rising Turkish nationalism during its rule went hand in hand with the Citation: Ülker, Erol 'Assimilation of the Muslim communities in the first decade of the Turkish Republic (1923 Republic ( -1934 increasing sensitivity to the ethnic, religious and linguistic peculiarities of the subject population. One of the goals of the settlement policies was to promote the assimilation of immigrant communities into Turkish culture on the one hand, and not to allow the clustering of the same ethnic group in the same region on the other (Ülker 2005: 626-629) . In locating Albanian immigrants, for example, the government was intent on settling them in regions far away from the Balkans. Çatalca, Edirne, İstanbul, İzmir and Karesi, were closed to the settlement of Albanian immigrants (Dündar 1999: 114) .
Similar measures were undertaken for the settlement of Bosnian immigrants. There was no regional restriction for Bosnians' settlement but promoting their assimilation in Turkish culture was one the major concerns of the government in locating them (Dündar 1999: 124) . For both the settlement of Albanian and Bosnian immigrants, the government applied to a condition according to which, in a region, the total number of the immigrants should be below ten per cent of the total Turkish inhabitants (Ağanoğlu 2001: 117) .
[9] I show below that the government of the young Republic drew on the policies that had been developed earlier by the CUP rule. This continuity in the application of immigration-settlement policies in the first decade of the Republic has actually broader connotations for the analysis of Turkish nationalism in the interwar period. It questions an established view running through the large body of scholarship about Turkish nationalism. There is almost a consensus that the 1930s was a period in which Turkish nationalism was imbued gradually more with an ethnic formulation of Turkishness. In this respect, a significant difference is pointed out between the 1920s and the 1930s in terms of the formulation of Turkishness. Of importance to this article, the aggressive wording of the settlement law of 1934, which makes open ethnic references to Turkishness, is indicated as the result of the growing emphasis on ethnicity.
[10] There is no way to refuse the genuine shift towards more ethnic formulation of Turkishness in the political discourse during the second decade of the Republic. Nor is it possible to overlook the aggressive discourse of the settlement law of the 1934. Yet if we step out of the sphere of discourse and look at the actual state policies, the distinction made between the 1920s and the 1930s gets blurred. I demonstrate below that before the promulgation of the law of 1934, the government had already set in motion an assimilatory mentality in the settlement policies. This means that the actual state practices with respect to settlement-immigration policies did not differ fundamentally from the 1920s to the 1930s as far as the assimilation of the Muslim population was concerned. One cannot find significant differences in these two periods at the level of settlement policies in the sense of the classification of the population according to the cultural and linguistic features identified with dominant Turkish population.
[11] In what follows, I deal first with the influx of the immigrants to the country with special attention to the promotion of immigrations from the Balkans. Subsequently, the assimilatory measures of settlement are demonstrated. Consideration is given not only to the laws and regulations of settlement but also to their implementation as far as the available documents allow.
[12] Before proceeding any further, however, it should be acknowledged that this research leaves out a set of crucial aspects of settlement-immigration policies because of a lack of sufficient data. First and foremost, unless otherwise stated, we are not able to follow in most cases whether the official decisions and measures were actually implemented. Although this is admittedly a serious problem given the material weakness of the young Republic, I believe we can still come to significant conclusions about what was intended more than what was practiced on the basis of available data.
Secondly, this article aims to display the state perspective on immigration-settlement rather than that of immigrant communities. It takes a fundamentally different sociological study to investigate the reaction of the immigrant communities to the state-initiated policies, which is beyond the concerns of this study. Thirdly, despite its significance, I exclude from my analysis the negotiations between the immigrants and the state, which must have had grave importance on the actual practices of settlement. Being concerned with the state mentality of assimilation, I deliberately choose to focus on what was meant by the official policies of settlement-immigration.
I. Promotion of Immigrations
[13] The period from 1923 to 1939 witnessed state-generated influx of immigrants especially from the Balkan countries. Around 800,000 people entered Turkey as immigrant in these years 4 .
Significant number of them came from Greece under the framework of population exchange implemented after 1923. According to Geray (1962: 11) (Milliyet, 15 June 1927: 3) and some others were settled in Malatya (BCA, Fon No: 272.0.0..12, Yer No: 55.139..20, 13/11/1927) . Besides, according to an official report, Turkish population residing in Yemen longed for migrating to Turkey (BCA, Fon No: 272.0.0..12, Yer No: 45.75..22, 20/7/1925 ). There were immigrations even from Finland and Jordan (Çağatay, 2002a: 223 [15] Two significant themes imprinted their marks onto Turkey's immigration policy and brought about the promotion of the immigration flows. First, Anatolia was dramatically depopulated due to the war conditions before the construction of the new Republic. Hence, nationalist elite viewed the influx of immigrants to the country as one of the ways to increase the population. Hamdullah
Suphi, a prominent figure of Turkish nationalism, expressed this consideration clearly in the discussions held in Turkish Parliament: 'I wonder if those who saw the empty spaces in Anatolia do not agree with the necessity to bring two-two and a half million more Turks to Anatolia' 8 . He held that bringing the Muslim-Turkish communities inhabiting various corners of the Balkans and settling them in Anatolia was an urgent necessity to solve the demographic problems of Turkey.
[16] Secondly, as aptly observed by Tanıl Bora (1995: 35-36) , the consideration of bringing the remaining Muslim-Turkish communities of the Balkans became a nationalist motto that was repeated by nationalist intelligentsia up to the end of the 1930s. The influx of immigrants to Anatolia was conceived as a factor strengthening the cohesion and homogeneity of Turkish nation. They were viewed as loyal members of the nation who shared the historical, cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire. Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Internal Affairs, stated this consideration concerning the population exchange as follows:
'The primary debt of a nation, the highest duty of a government is to assure the unity of a nation within its country. The basis of the convention of population exchange implemented in Lausanne is related with this object and formed for this object' 9 .
[17] He added in the same speech that 'Thanks to Lausanne Treaty, we added 500,000 people out of the strongest elements of our race to our country' 10 . He conceived the immigration of 
II. Settlement Policies
[18] In reality, however, many non-Turkish ethnic and linguistic Muslim groups entered the country alongside Muslim-Turkish communities. The number of people whose native or secondary language was Albanian increased from 21,774 to 40,647 between 1927 and 1935 according to the demographic censuses conducted in these years (Dündar 1999: 81) . According to the census of 1935, there were 38,141 people speaking Bosnian (Dündar 1999: 84) and 41,041 people speaking Pomak language as mother tongue or secondary dialect (Dündar 1999: 121) [20] Apparently, this law linked the admission of immigrants and refugees to the condition of affinity with Turkish culture. However, who was to be considered within this category was not specified in this law. Indeed, aside from outside Muslim-Turk population, this category was referring also to be admitted. Although we cannot make sure the degree to which the government was able to practice this memorandum in reality, it is clear that it did not promote the coming of further Albanians since they were not counted among the ethnic groups perceived as tied to Turkish culture. Albanian immigration was restricted with the families of those who had already migrated 16 . The immigration claims of Gypsies were also to be rejected.
[22] Once admitted, however, the groups that were categorized as people of Turkish culture were to be subject to settlement policies that had been designed to assimilate them. In other words, as will be shown below, they would be accepted as new citizens of the Republic alongside who were considered as Turk immigrants but then would become the target of the homogenization efforts of the State. On the other hand, the settlement of Turkish-speaking immigrants especially of Balkan origin constituted the other dimension of social engineering. They were located to regions that were sensitive according to the national security concerns, such as Thrace and Eastern Anatolia. (Ladas 1932: 707) .
[24] At the same time, the government did not refrain from developing a long-term perspective of settlement that was to be put into the service of nation-building policies. [25] In the first place, Articles 17 and 18 of this decree linked the issue of the settlement to the condition of nationality 19 . The former article leaves the decision about the place for settlement to the Turkish exchangees as long as they could afford the required costs without any demand from the government. Nevertheless, according to the latter article, it was obligatory for non-Turks to settle in the regions assigned by the government, regardless of their material conditions. [26] On the other hand, Article 29 made the conditions for the settlement of the non-Turkish and non-Turkish-speaking immigrants clear.
'By taking into account that the most difficult obstacle to the civil and social improvement is the dissimilarity in the language and customs, the proportion of the immigrants, regardless of race or nationality, whose language and customs belong to another race shall never be over 20 percent in any Turkish town and village' 20 .
[27] Professional and racial traits will be taken into consideration, in addition to the geographical and economical features of the places they immigrated from. It is apparent in these stipulations that the government aimed to settle the non-Turkish-speaking immigrants on the basis of the conditions that made their adaptation to Turkish culture and language as easy as possible. By limiting their proportion to 20 % in Turkish towns and villages, it was intended to make their assimilation possible without posing any threat to the social order. However, we cannot make sure the extent to which these stipulations, including the restriction of 20 %, were actually practiced. [29] In the early years of the Republic, the government attempted to follow this mentality in settling immigrants. In particular, it was careful with Albanian and Bosnian immigrants and endeavored to settle them in a programmatic way. As early as August 4, 1923, the Turkish Grand National Assembly addressed a decree to most of the provinces of the country, inquiring about the 20 One point has to be clarified at this juncture. In all the official correspondences mentioned in this article, the term 'Türk' is used. I sometimes have to translate this term as Turkish for grammatical convenience. The terms Turkish and Turk are used interchangeably for 'Türk', unless otherwise stated. In this quotation, for example, 'Turkish town and village' stands for 'Türk kasaba ve köyünde'. In my own wording, I also use these terms interchangeably to refer to 'Türk' when I make reference to official correspondences to avoid repeating the same word. I would like to thank the anonymous reader for drawing my attention to possible confusions that would arise from the use of Turk and Turkish for the same category of 'Türk'. Ibid., p. 140. 'It is decided to transfer 500 Albanian people who dwell in İzmir-Bornova to interior regions. It is requested urgently to be made known how many families could be settled in the province conditionally to the abandoned Armenian properties and in a scattered way' 24 .
[30] This decree that was addressed to the local authorities of Niğde and Burdur provinces reveals important aspects of the Republic's settlement policies in its early years. On the one hand, the specific condition it provided illuminates the assimilative perspective of the settlement policies.
The Ministry sought to prevent concentration in one region, which would make assimilation harder.
On the other hand, this decree demonstrates another policy the Republic set in motion from its early years on. The settlement of non-Turkish immigrants to some areas, which were conceived as delicate regions according to the national security concerns, was viewed inappropriate. Aegean coasts, for instance, came to be one such delicate area in the face of the tensions with Greece and subsequently with Italy. In most cases, interior Anatolia was the ideal place to locate non-Turkish immigrants. On March 16, 1923, for example, another group of Albanian immigrants was transferred from İzmit to the interior provinces of Konya and Eskisehir 25 .
[31] We cannot figure from the aforementioned documents the period in which the immigrants referred to came to Anatolia. Yet it is for sure that Albanians and Bosnians were not the only groups of people whose settlement in regions such as Thrace, Eastern and Western Anatolia was prevented. exchangees who had left the areas of Çanakkale and Bursa, to their original settlement places 32 . The important point here is that this group had emigrated from Crete where the Muslim population had been largely Greek speaking (Popoviç 1995: 313-318) . Alongside the Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks and Roma people, the government was cautious in settling the exchangees from Crete. This policy continued to be carried out in the subsequent years. In 1933, for example, an official report ordered the application of the aforementioned Law 675 carefully for the exchangee 'Gypsies' who had left their official settlement areas of Mersin and had gone to İzmir 33 .
[35] Evidently, alongside the necessity of coping with the demographic chaos, an assimilatory goal was also on the agenda of the settlement policies in the early years of the Republic. In practice, however, this could not be realized successfully and the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement became the target of harsh criticism in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
The Closing of the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement [36] The problems that appeared in the settlement of exchangees came to be a major subject in the National Assembly. Esat Bey, deputy of Menteşe region, addressed the following questions to the Ministry 34 : How many immigrants and exchangees had come? How many immigrants and exchangees had been settled? How much reconstruction had been made and where? [37] This interpellation ignited discussions and critiques with respect to the implementation of the settlement policies. Some of the critiques were related to the material difficulties, administrative mistakes and improprieties, which resulted in casualties and material losses not only of the exchangees but also of the other immigrants and the homeless people (Aktar 1997: 32-41) 35 .
[38] Nevertheless, another topic expressed repeatedly by most of the deputies is more notable for the focus of this paper. Alongside these problems, the Ministry was found unsuccessful in settling non-Turkish-speaking immigrants in accordance with the policy of assimilation. [39] Albanians appeared in the discussions of National Assembly before the interpellation of Esat Bey with another motion submitted by Mehmet Bey, deputy of Çanakkale 37 . This motion asked for information on the relocation of Albanians to the Erenköy district of İstanbul. As it became obvious with the speech of Mustafa Necati, former chief of the Ministry, the Albanian-speaking Muslims of Greece's Yanya region, who had immigrated to Turkey due to the population exchange, came to be the center of this dispute 38 . Nevertheless, the critics were not confined to Albanian speakers.
Hamdullah Suphi's speech clarified that what was perceived as a problem was not only the settlement of Albanians in a 'wrong' way but also the broader failure of the Ministry to apply the assimilatory principles of settlement provided by the aforementioned official regulations.
'They settled the Greek-speaking people around İstanbul. This is a gross error. They settled the incomers of Yanya from Gekbuze towards here. Some of them were settled in Çatalca and its surrounding. However, if there is a language different from Turkish in the areas inhabited by the overwhelming Turkish majority, we must isolate it (Applauds). They settled the Greek speaking masses right across the sea from the islands. A grave mistake! Soon, when peace truly reigns and if relations between the islands and our shores pick up and the Greek islanders and Greek-speaking masses reestablish contact, then it will be impossible to eradicate this language' 39 .
[40] Ali Şuri Bey, the deputy of Karesi, directed similar criticism to the implementation of settlement policies. 'At what time will we make Turkish the language of the people we call Turk? I wonder, why we do not compel, why we do not oppress. Kanun', no: 529, 11/12/1340 -11/12/1924 , Düstur, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 6, pp. 37-38. 43 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: II, Cilt: 23, İçtima: 74, 20/03/1926 , p.271. 44 'İskan Kanunu', no: 885, 31/06/1926 , Düstur, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 7, pp. 1441 -1443 . Ministers, which is to be implemented by the Ministry of Interior. There is also an important provision for the Roma people. According to Article 5, whereas the 'Gypsies' of Turkish nationality ought to be settled in an 'appropriate' region, foreign 'Gypsies' are to be expelled from the country.
[44] Up to 1934, when a new and more extensive law on settlement was adopted, this law continued to be used as one of the important instruments of the Republic's homogenization policies. (1927-30), and Dersim (1936-38) revolts during the interwar period (Bozarslan 2002: 848 dwellings from Bitlis to the western part of the country (Çağaptay 2002a: 228) .
[49] The policy of deportation was carried further even after the repression of the Ağrı revolt.
In November 1931, for example, in accordance with the government's decision to relocate some of the tribes on the Iraq frontier to the Western Provinces, a group of 300 families arrived at İstanbul and it was announced by the Turkish Press that they would be settled in Tekirdağ 53 . Moreover, 122
people belonging to the Halikanlı tribe, one of the recalcitrant tribes, arrived at İzmir via Trabzon and İstanbul in the same month 54 . At the beginning of 1932, the Turkish Press announced that the forced relocation of the Halikanlı tribe from eastern to western Turkey was completed. These tribesmen had been settled in Thrace and had already begun to cultivate the lands provided for them by the time this news item was published 55 .
[50] Another way of dealing with the disobedient Kurds was to change their settlement places without sending them to the western regions of the country. For this purpose, the Council of Ministers issued two important decrees in 1930 and in 1931 56 . They regulated the relocation of the Kurds inhabiting the mountainous areas of Dersim to the Elazığ plain. The reason underlying this decision was to transfer the unreliable elements from the places that were hard to control to the areas that were easier to exercise authority upon.
[51] Besides the policy of deportation, the government resorted to the settlement of immigrants to the Eastern Provinces in order to Turkify the region. In June 1927, for example, the In particular, it was about Kars, Bayazit, Erzurum and Çoruh provinces within which Ankara wanted to increase Turkish population. Both of these laws, in fact, were used to promote the migration of Turkish-speaking people to the eastern regions by providing the newcomers with material benefits. (Arı 2000: 8-11) . Besides the immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus, a significant number of native dwellers, who lost their homes because of the wartime conditions, were to be settled to prevent demographic chaos.
Concluding Remarks
[56] The policies of immigration and settlement had crucial importance for the founders of the Republic in this context. Increasing the population was regarded as an urgent necessity for both economic and social reasons. Thus bringing the Muslims residing outside of the country was seen as a solution to the demographic problems. At the same time, immigrants and homeless people were to be systematically settled and specific measures were to be undertaken to regulate this process. [57] However, these concerns constituted only one dimension of the immigration and settlement policies. The founders of the new state aspired for the creation of a nation-state. In their understanding this meant that the new state was to overlap a homogenous nation whose individuals were to be politically loyal Muslims, speaking Turkish and possessing Turkish culture. Nevertheless, besides having been depopulated and disordered, Anatolia was multiethnic and, to some extent, multi-religious. There were still Greeks, Jews and Armenians whose residence in Anatolia the nationalist elite found burdensome. Aside from them, the Muslim majority of the country was hardly homogenous. There were Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians and Arabs, who were speaking languages other than Turkish 66 .
[58] In this respect, the demographic devices of settlement and immigration were among the tools available for the government to homogenize the population on the basis of Turkish language and culture since the foundation of the Republic. The extent to which ethnicity and race became the reference points of the assimilation policies in the first decade of the Republic is open to discussion.
One can also question whether Turkish nationalism underwent a significant change in the 1930s in terms of the development of more ethnicity-oriented discourse. What is certain is that the ruling elite were attentive to the linguistic, cultural and religious unity of the population and this attentiveness reflected on the immigration-settlement policies. Concerning these policies of nation-building, there was no significant difference between the 1930s and the 20s. In both periods, the state was concerned with religious homogeneity as well as linguistic-cultural assimilation. The nationalist discourse at the state level seems to have evolved into a more essentialist, ethnicist one from the 1920s to the 30s. Nevertheless, this evolution seems to have little effect on the policies of nationbuilding. 66 For official numbers of non-Turkish-speaking Muslims in the censuses, see Fuat Dündar (1999) .
